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Our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this  
small planet.  We all breathe the same air.  We all  
cherish our children’s future.  And we are all mortal. 
- John F. Kennedy1 
  
                                               
1 Commencement Address at American University Law Faculty, Washington D.C., June 10, 1963 
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ABSTRACT:  Reducing CO2 emissions from the shipping sector represent a 
challenge for the international community.  The European Union has given a step 
forward with the adoption of Regulation 2015/757 establishing the obligation to 
all ships calling for an EU port to surrender detailed information regarding the 
CO2 emissions for the entire voyage.  Such an obligation may raise issues of 
jurisdictional overreach of European Law when ships come from beyond a 
member State’s EEZ, and will overlap with the IMO regulatory task pursuant the 
Kyoto Protocol Art. 2.2 mandate.  The aim of this essay is firstly to assess the 
current policy options to address the shipping emissions conundrum, review the 
existing regulatory framework at the international and community level and see 
how international actors interact with each other in the policymaking process.  
Secondly, Regulation 2015/757 and its application problems will be assessed, 
especially the jurisdictional concerns, to conclude that the active legislative role of 
the EU is desirable towards encouraging the IMO to reach a global agreement on 
CO2 decisive reduction. 
 
KEYWORDS:   GHG, emissions, maritime transport, CO2, jurisdictional 
overreach, ports, climate change, European Union, IMO 
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Abreviations 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
COP Conference of the Parties 
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change 
UN United Nations 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
MEPC Marine and Environment Protection Committee 
MARPOL Marine Pollution (Agreement) 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
UNCED United Nations Convention on Environment and Development 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
EU European Union 
EFTA European Free Trade Area 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EMSA European Marine Safety Agency 
WG Working Group 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
EMAS Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
SPMS State Ports and Merchant Shipping 
CBDR Common But Differentiated Responsibilities 
NFT No Favorable Treatment 
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
MRV Monitoring Reporting and Verification 
MBM Market Based Measures 
ETS Emission Trading Scheme 
EEZ Economic Exclusive Zone 
GT Gross Tonnage 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
Nox Nitrogen Oxides 
Sox Sulfur Oxides 
PM Particulated Matter 
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I. Introduction 
 
A. Current state of the matter 
Climate change is a present issue in the international agenda.  By means of 
instruments such as the UNFCCC and the KP as the current climate governance 
framework, GHG’s from all sectors of most member States’ industries have been 
regulated, except for those from aviation and shipping. 
Excluded from the KP general provisions, maritime emissions were assigned to its 
sectoral organization, the IMO.  Given the complexity of GHG emissions 
allocation from a moving source such as a vessel, there is currently no national 
allocation.  Furthermore, the IMO regulatory task towards emissions reduction 
has not been decisive, focusing on energy efficiency operational measures, 
without any binding reduction objective for the shipping sector after almost 20 
years of the KP’s mandate. 
In contrast with the IMO’s regulatory slow pace, the EU has ambitious objectives 
dealing with GHG emission reduction in the short term.  Although cooperation 
through IMO to address the emissions issue has been acknowledged, the EU has 
taken what seems to be a regional approach with the adoption of Regulation 
2015/757/EU (the Regulation), intended to monitor, report and verify (MRV) the 
emissions of ships calling EU ports by assessing their energy efficiency.  This 
assessment is essential towards the adoption of a decisive measure to counter ship 
sourced GHG emissions.  However, it should have been taken by the IMO, 
following Art. 2.2 of the KP. 
In this context, the aim of the present study is: 
Part I, to identify the problem, and the possible solutions, proposed.   
Part II will introduce the actors, the decision making processes, international 
instruments adopted, and the results obtained so far.
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Part III and Part IV will analyze Regulation 757.  This analysis will consist of a 
twofold study: first, the objectives, methodology and immediate application issues 
(subjects, implementation, and non-compliance) of the norm (Part III).  Second, 
issues dealing with jurisdiction and extraterritoriality of the Regulation (Part 
Four).   
This essay will allow, in light of the existent legislation and context, answering 
the following questions:  what are the possible application problems arising from 
the enforcement of Regulation 2015/757?  Up to what extent these problems 
imply a regulatory overreach of the EU? 
B. Methodology 
The materials to be used in the elaboration of this study will be international 
instruments governing climate change, European Union legislation, and other 
primary legal sources.   
Interviews to persons from the public sector directly related to port activities such 
as the Harbor Master’s Office and the Department of Environment of the Port of 
Barcelona; as well as opinions from former public authorities related to 
environment and climate change will also be an asset to this paper. 
Circulars, memos, press notes, official position papers, among others of similar 
nature from official websites from the institutions of the aforementioned 
legislation, as well as information from verifiers and maritime business companies 
will also be evaluated, as they are the first affected parties by the Regulation.   
Finally, and in order to better understand and integrate the information compiled, 
independent academic papers on the field will be essential to form a legal opinion 
answering the questions of this essay. 
C. Emissions:  The Problem 
This part will cover the source of the emissions and the effects on the environment, 
justifying the need for regulatory measures. 
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1. Maritime Shipping Emissions2 
Maritime shipping is the least pollutant mean of cargo transportation3.  It is cost-
effective and responsible for 80% of international exchanges4, being a key factor 
to world trade.  Shipping carries a higher amount of tonnage by discharging fewer 
emissions to the atmosphere5.  This is due to the energy efficiency in the usage of 
marine bunker fuels6, long distances covered, and large containing capacity of 
vessels 7  compared to the limited capacity of other means, such as terrestrial 
transportation, or aviation. 
However, shipping industry is responsible for 3% of the world’s GHG emissions 
per year8.  This amount equals –and in some cases far exceeds- the emissions 
generated by entire countries9.  Moreover, growing at its current pace, this CO2 
contribution may raise to 5% by 205010.   
2. Shipping Sector Grows, Emissions Increase  
The environmental consequences of shipping are visible since the XXth Century 
with the improvement of engine technologies and the opening of artificial 
transoceanic passes such as the Panama Canal.  These facts determined a growing 
                                               
2 IMO (2009), Second GHG Study 2009, MEPC, pp 3 (executive summary), and 151.  This study 
refers to the international shipping emissions, as opposed to domestic emissions, since they are 
already covered by the States, following territorial criteria. 
3 IMO, Marine Environment, retrieved:  16.04.16, 
 <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Default.aspx>  
4 European Commission, COM (2009) 8, Strategic Goals and Recommendations for the EU’s 
Maritime Transport Policy until 2018, pp1   
5 V i a n a  Mar, et al., Impact of Maritime Transport Emissions in the Air Quality of European 
Coastal Areas (2014), Elsevier, pp1  
6 K o l l a m t h o d i  Sujith, et al., Support for the Impact Assessment of a Proposal to address 
Maritime Transport Greenhouse Gas Emissions (2013), RICARDO AEA, pp25   Study prepared 
by the independent consultancy RICARDO AEA at the request of the Commission. 
7 J ä h n  Carlos, Efficiency of Maritime Transport, (post 2011)  
8 Vid. Op. supr. K o l l a m t h o d i  Sujith, et al., pp21  
9 Union of Concerned Scientists, Percentage of CO2 Emissions per Country, (2014), retrieved:  
16.04.16 
 <http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-
co2.html#.Vx-yjXoauJE>  
10 European Commission, Integrating Maritime Transport Emissions in the EU’s Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Policies (COM 2013/479) pp3 
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boom of commerce and shipping, bunker fuel consumption, and consequently, 
fuel oil discharges, with increasing atmospheric emissions11. 
Furthermore, economic growth due to a modern legal framework ensuring the 
safety of shipping and the promotion of world commerce, settled the foundations 
of globalization 12 .  The direct effect is a growing need for shipping and an 
increased fleet.   
3. Effects on the Environment and Human Health 
The combustion of marine fuels produces different kinds of pollutants; the most 
common are nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), particulate matter 
(imperceptible ash in suspension) and CO213.   The combustion of all fossil fuels 
produces CO2, cause of 20% of the GHGs14.  This process feeds back through 
constant production of GHG emissions from many sources, being 5% of them 
aviation and the estimated 48 thousand merchant vessels15 sailing the oceans. 
SOx, NOx, and particulate matter (PM) have a regional effect16, and in the case of 
the Port of Barcelona, their contribution is of 10% of the city’s pollution and 
around 20% of the metropolitan area’s17.  Effects are visible in the short term, 
contributing to the acidification of soil 18 , rivers 19 , and human health.  It is 
                                               
11 C o r b e t t  James, W i n e b r a k e  James, (2008) The Impacts of Globalization on 
International Maritime Transport Activity, OECD pp14  
12 UNCTAD, (2013) Key Trends in International Transport and Implications for Development, 
pp5  
13 V i n c e n t  Ingrid, (2012) Emissions from Ship Machinery, Greenship, pp 21  
14 L a c i s  Andrew, (2010) CO2:  The Thermostat that controls Earth’s Temperature, NASA, 
retrieved: 16.04.16 <http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/briefs/lacis_01/>  
15 UNCTAD, (2015) Merchant Fleet by Flag of Registration and by Type of Ship:  annual 1980-
2015, UNCTADSTATs, retrieved:  16.04.16, 
  <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx>     
16 Vid. Op. supr., Viana, Mar, pp2   
17 Port de Barcelona (2013), Medi Atmosfèric, retrieved:  16.04.16 
  <http://www.portdebarcelona.cat/web/el-port/qualitat-de-l-aire>  
18 Air Quality, Impact of Acid Rain on Soils, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://www.air-quality.org.uk/16.php>  
19 Air Quality, Fresh Water Acidification, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://www.air-quality.org.uk/13.php>  
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estimated that only in the United States, 200 000 early deaths annually are 
produced due to the poor quality of air20.   
It might appear that these emissions are almost imperceptible, accompanying the 
view of atmosphere as a res nullius without a framework preventing any 
hazardous effect.  On the contrary, hard evidence proves that the atmosphere acts 
as a planetary sink 21 , where all anthropocentric discharges gather together 
generating a negative effect both in the short and long term.   
This evidence shows that is time for global action, setting 2020-2030 as a deadline 
after which mitigation will be next to impossible22.  Proposed courses of action 
will be covered on the next section. 
D. The Solution:  Alternatives to address the issue 
1. Context and Policy Background 
Alternatives have been discussed over the last decade in order to counter the rising 
levels of shipping GHGs. Decision makers at an international and regional level 
such as the IMO and the EU respectively have had an active role regarding policy 
options23.  However, it has not been possible to define any concrete measures as 
we will see in Part Two.   
The considered policy options are24:  i) Compensatory fund;  ii) Tax on carbon,  
and;  iv)  Maritime emission trading system.  However, it must be stated that prior 
to the development of any policy, it is necessary to have accurate data on the fuel 
consumption and the energy efficiency of ships separately.  For this reason, the 
                                               
20 C a i a z z o et al., (2013) Air Pollution and Early Deaths in the US, Part I, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, pp3.  Combines the effects of different sectors, being road transport the 
first contributor. 
21 E d e n h o f e r  Ottmar, et al., (2013) The Atmosphere as a Global Commons, Challenges for 
International Cooperation and Governance, Harvard Kennedy School for Governance, pp5  
22 Vid. Op. supr., Edenhofer et al.  pp6. 
23 See also, IMO GHG Studies, 2000, 2009, 2014, and Communication from the Commission 
regarding the inclusion of maritime emissions on the EU’s reduction plans.  
24  European Commission, (2011) Second Meeting of the ECCP Working Group on Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Climate Action, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/articles/0036_en.htm>  
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EU has taken a step forward by adopting Regulation 757 to have this information 
and further to the policy debate. 
As for the Commission’s WG on shipping, the principles 25  guiding any 
policymaking should be:  i) Geographical scope, giving the idea of the measure’s 
reach, relevant to any jurisdictional overreach issues;  ii) Cap sets a ceiling, 
representing not only a limit, but the measure’s reduction objective;  iii) 
Stringency and avoidance are determinant to the policy’s goal:  May it be too 
stringent; it will be avoided, or even discourage economic activity.  On the other 
extreme, may it be too loose; the objective will not be achieved. 
2. Compensatory fund 
Establishes a fund, where all ships have the obligation to contribute according 
with the levy set by the policy26.  Such basis may be bunker fuel consumption, 
where the ship will have to pay according to the tons of fuel loaded.  Ultimately, 
the funds collected will be used for capacity building, technological development, 
and transfers to developing countries to level unbalances when enforcing the 
implementing policy of the fund on their fleet27.   
Given these facts, controversy may arise as to who is the third party in control of 
the fund, a public or private entity, and typically, considering that it should be 
enforced in ports, a global agreement will be necessary for a good enforcement, 
which results to be time consuming. 
3. Collecting the Fund:  Carbon Tax 
Defended by most, it has been suggested not only by pressure groups on the last 
COP in Paris, but also in a 2016 report by the IMF, and in 2015 by the OECD.  As 
advanced, it would imply taxing fuel consumption of ships, being the levy 
                                               
25 N e l i s s e n, Dagmar et al., (2011), EU Policies to Address Maritime Shipping Emissions, 
Umweltbundesamt, Deutschland pp4   
26 Vid. Op. supr., Kollamthodi et al. pp94   
27  See CE DELFT (2013), Shipping report, Carbon Pricing for Shipping, the collection and 
handling of finances; pp 9, and;  OECD (2015) Shipping and Climate Change, Where are we and 
which way forward? Pp3,4 
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suggested by the IMF of 30$ per ton of fuel consumed28, with a minimal expected 
economic impact on the sector29. 
On the positive side, its administrative simplicity is praised30, as in our opinion; it 
would work like a regular tax, most likely enforced by the Port Authority as any 
other port obligation of a vessel calling for an EU port.  On the negative side, a 
global agreement will be needed, demanding uniformity of application and 
enforcement in all ports.  Recalling the avoidance feature mentioned before, it 
would be easy for a ship just to avoid a port requiring such tax when refueling, 
thus leaving the measure pointless. 
In conclusion, overcoming challenges such as international cooperation, and 
operational aspects of how and who will collect the tax before transferring them to 
the global high authority, might seem overwhelming.  However, it would be the 
most effective measure keeping in mind its four effects:  i)  modification of fuel 
consumption patterns;  ii)  compensation of developing countries enforcing the tax 
policy;  iii)  allocate the funds for technology improvement, and;  iv)  last but not 
least, will drastically reduce the emissions, making possible to meet the effort of a 
zero carbon emissions by the end of the century.  
4. Market Based Measures (MBMs) 
This option sets an emissions cap, meaning that an overall emissions limit will be 
fixated and enforced31.  Allowances are allocated to all the market players up to 
the limit –the cap- and must be surrendered when calling a port, according to the 
emitted CO2 per ship.  The aim is to incent the shipping industry to use more 
efficient fuels, and improve operational techniques and technology32. 
Assessed its features, the expected effect of an MBM will be for large companies 
to improve their technical performance in a sustainable manner assuming it as an 
                                               
28 IMF (2016), After Paris, Fiscal macroeconomic, and financial implications of Climate Change, 
pp28 
29 OECD (2015) Shipping and Climate Change, Where are we and which way forward? Pp4 
30 vid. op. supra, OECD (2015) Shipping and Climate Change, pp4  
31 Vid. Op. supr, Kollamthodi et al., pp71 
32 Vid. Op. supr, Kollamthodi et al., pp71  
17 
 
environmental fixed cost.  For small companies, allows continuing business as 
usual, without a major market disruptive effect.  Thus, interiorizing the perception 
of environmental protection by the private sector, by playing the rules of the 
market, instead classical command and control instruments.   
In opinion of Dr. Josep Llebot33, and in contrast with a tax on carbon, the priority 
of an MBM are not the emissions, but the economical and social cost of the 
measure, consequently having a slow paced result.  Whereas a tax on carbon 
addresses the problem directly and represents the best way to interiorize the 
environmental costs of an operation and reconsider certain human activities. 
E. Preliminary Conclusions of Part I 
Having assessed the policies available, the issues on their implementation start to 
surface:  agreement of States, policymakers, and stakeholders.  Even if the most 
reasonable measure is a tax on carbon to decisively start to solve the shipping 
emissions problem, the dynamics between international actors is an important 
hindrance. 
Consequently, before taking any new policy, in the next part we will see the 
existing rules governing climate change, if they are being enforced and most 
importantly, if they are efficient to solve the problem.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
33  See Annex II.  Dr. Josep Enric Llebot is Professor of Physics at the UAB, and has been 
Secretary General of Environment at the Catalan Administration. 
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II. Regulatory Framework:  Policy Makers and International Actors   
   
In this part we will study the different actors participating in the policymaking 
process of global climate governance applied to maritime transportation, how they 
interact with each other, what relevant contributions have they done, and what are 
the major setbacks they may find. 
 
A. Global level:  The UNFCCC 
1. Context 
The UNFCCC is an international Treaty signed at the seat of the UN in New 
York in 1994 by 197 States, of which 165 have ratified the Convention34, being 
Spain and the EU ratifying parties35.  Further to Art. 23, it entered into force on 21 
March, 1994. 
The UNFCCC starts at the 1992 UNCED, also called Earth Summit, which 
concluded with the Rio Declaration, major environmental legal landmark36.  At 
the closing session of the Earth Summit, the UNFCCC was open for signature 
along the Rio Declaration 37.  The Summit served as an opportunity to focus on 
different environmental issues, one of them being climate change and increasingly 
hazardous levels of GHG. 
The objective of the Convention is “the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
                                               
34 UNFCCC, (2014) First Steps to a Safer Future:  Introducing the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, retrieved:  16.04.16 
  <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php>  
35 UNFCCC, (2016) Convention Status of Ratification 
 <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php>  
36 United Nations, (2016) Audiovisual Library of International Law, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html>  
37 World Meteorological Organization, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
retrieved:  16.04.16 <https://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/international_unfccc.php>  
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anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Art. 2).  Even if too general,   
the implementation of this objective is to be achieved through the COPs, 
instrumental to the purposes of the Convention, and foreseen to produce more 
detailed guidelines and specific goals38.   
Party States do commit themselves to the creation of the so called GHG 
inventories, following IPCC guidelines (Art. 4.1.a), and to communicate the state 
of such inventories to the COP (Art. 12) as well as the measures taken to achieve 
the set goals.  
Universally accepted principles of Environmental Law emerged from this 
Convention, such as the common but differentiated responsibilities (Art. 3.139), 
laying out the enhanced responsibility held by developed countries, being the ones 
discharging the most GHG emissions to the atmosphere.  Further to this principle, 
one of the most important commitments for developed countries is to return to 
emission levels of 1990 (Art. 4.2.b) 
Such differentiation is made by Annexes I (industrialized and developed countries 
including Spain and the EU);  and II (OECD countries) of the Treaty.  It also 
provides in Art. 4.1 c) the cooperation with developing countries “soft” obligation 
(the wording uses the term shall) towards capacity building.  This could be related 
to Art. 6 b) ii)    establishing the need to cooperate with developing countries on 
the exchange of trained scientific personnel.   
In second term, we find the precautionary principle (Art. 3.3), especially relevant 
to this study, as it establishes the necessity of action towards an environmental 
hazard, even if scientific studies cannot unanimously prove the causal chain.40 
As advanced, Art. 7.2 provides that States must work together through yearly 
Conferences in order to set goals in order to achieve the purposes of the 
                                               
38 United Nations, (1992) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Treaty, Art. 
2, Objective  
39 Vid. Op. supr., United Nations, (1992) UNFCCC Treaty, Art. 3.1  
40 Vid. Op. supr., United Nations, (1992) UNFCCC Treaty, Art. 3.3 
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Framework Convention41.  For instance, COP 16 in Cancún set the 2º limit to 
global warming objective, and the establishment of the Green Climate Fund, 
designated to be the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the 
convention42.  
2. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) 43 
The main objective of the KP was essentially the same as the UNFCCC:  decrease 
the GHG emissions from member States44.  However, it proposed the means to 
achieve this decrease –namely introducing the concept of reporting and 
verification of Emissions and a Trading Scheme-45(Art. 17), sat a precise target –
to return to preindustrial levels of GHG emissions, under 2ºC as set in the 2010 
Cancún Agreement46- and established a commitment period, from 2008 to 201247.  
The most remarkable progress from that period was that States reduced overall 24% 
of the emissions, surpassing the initial objective of 4%48.  A new commitment 
period has been established from 2013 to 202049. 
                                               
41  H e r z  Steffen, (2012) Emissionshandel im Luftverkehr, Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, 
Universität Halle, pp24 
42 UNFCCC, (2014) Cancún Agreements, retrieved:  16.04.16  
< http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/6005.php >;  and Milestones on the Road to 
2012:  The Cancun Agreements, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://unfccc.int/key_steps/cancun_agreements/items/6132.php> ;  and  
UNFCCC, (2011) Report on the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, held in Cancun 
from the 29 November to the 10 December, 2010, pp 3 
43 UNFCCC, (2014) Kyoto Protocol, retrieved:  16.04.16  
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php>  
44 B ö h r i n g e r, Christoph, (post 2012) The Kyoto Protocol, A Review and Perspectives, Zentral 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Manheimm, pp5   
45 UNFCCC, (1998) Kyoto Protocol, International Instrument, Article 17   
46  UNFCCC, (2014) Milestones on the Road to 2012:  The Cancun Agreements, retrieved:  
16.04.16 <http://unfccc.int/key_steps/cancun_agreements/items/6132.php> ;  UNFCCC, (2011) 
Report on the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, held in Cancun from the 29 
November to the 10 December, 2010, pp 3 
47 European Commission, (2015), EU meets Kyoto Targets under the First Commitment Period 
2008-2012, Climate Action, retrieved:  16.04.16  
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015111803_en.htm>  
48 M o r e l  Romain, S h i s l o v  Igor;  (2014) Ex-post evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol:  Four 
Key Lessons for the Paris Agreement, Climate Report, pp5 
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retrieved:  16.04.16 < http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php > 
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Concurring with Dr. Llebot’s assessment on the KP, one may think that it has not 
been entirely helpful to its purposes of reducing emissions.  However, it 
introduced the best technical options to conduct verifications, calculate emissions, 
or make the inventory.  The “how to”.  But above all, its most important 
achievement was to do so gathering the support of most of the international 
community, with the exception of the United States. 
 As for shipping emissions Art. 2 of the Protocol, is relevant since it sets out all 
the sectors of activity demanding a reduction of gases.  However, aviation and 
maritime shipping were excluded.  Notwithstanding this exclusion, Art. 2.2 of the 
KP establishes a mandate to the ICAO and the IMO to “…pursue limitation or 
reduction of greenhouse gases…”.50 
To approach this issue, it is necessary to understand the peculiar regime of a 
vessel51.  A ship may belong to an entity or a person of a certain nationality, and 
be registered in a convenient jurisdiction –most likely Panama or Liberia- in 
terms of technical requirements and labor issues.  Managed by a company of 
different nationality from the Flag and from the proprietor’s, the ship calls for 
different ports around the world abiding to the each of the port’s regulations.   
 Now, as for the guiding principles of the UNFCCC:  CO2 emissions are to be 
addressed guided by the CBDR52, meaning that the most pollutant countries have 
an enhanced responsibility. From this principle lies the obligation to prepare 
national inventories of GHG, allocated following the logic of territoriality.  It is 
uncertain the way to proceed with a vessel considering the array of links it has:  
Flag, proprietor, fuelling port… The situation was that challenging that they 
didn’t know how to advance, and initially didn’t allocate those emissions.   
The issue was assigned to the IMO, an organization guided by the principle of “no 
favorable treatment” (NFT) treating ships equally regardless of their flag, sparking 
                                               
50 UNFCCC, (2000) Historical Origins of the Kyoto Protocol:  Article per Article Study, pp27  
51 S t r o n g  Aaron, (2011) Tackling Maritime Fuel Bunker Emissions, Master Thesis, pp3 
52 D o u d n i k o f f  Marjorie, (2015) Réduire les Émissions du Transport Maritime : Les 
Politiques Publiques et leurs Impacts sur les Stratégies des Compagnies Maritimes de Lignes 
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a new challenge:  finding a balance between CBDR and NFT.  According to Van 
Leeuwen, this clash of regimes is a mismatch, only bringing uncertainty and 
confusion as for policy making. 
3. Paris Agreements (2015) 
In a general view, COP 21 at Paris has not live up to the expectations53.   From the 
aviation and maritime shipping point of view, the Conference still lacks direct 
address to this issue54.  It is relevant to point out that the United States is a 
signatory State to the Paris Agreement55, but only under the condition to establish 
equally responsibilities for all States, and thus, deforming the common but 
differentiated principle56.   
As for the legal form, the Paris Agreement is a Treaty, open for signature on April 
22nd 2016 till April 21st 2017, requiring at least 55 signatories representing 50% of 
global emissions.  It is expected to enter into force in 202057.  Interestingly, the 
only nations having ratified the agreement are insular territories threatened by 
rising sea levels, triggered by climate change. 58 The EU and Spain have signed, 
not yet ratified. 
The agreement is legally binding, however the wording of important 
commitments such as the intended national determined contributions (national 
climate action plans to be presented every 5 years) leaves flexibility as to how the 
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State will implement such plans59.  Furthermore, the INDCs are just mentioned, 
but not described in the body of the Treaty.   
A reference to the precarious situation of aviation and maritime transport was 
going to be made by motion of the Commission60, however it disappeared from 
the order of the day.  The text was even drafted, but eventually no mention was 
made.  The Commission was quite pressured by social sectors demanding to take 
action regarding to the exclusion of airlines representing millions of concerned 
European citizens61.  Both ICAO and IMO were present at the Paris talks, but 
other than studies, no concrete measures were taken. 
B. Sectoral level:  IMO  
1. The IMO 
The International Maritime Organization is a UN specialized organization.  
Responsible for the security and regulation of international maritime 62 , it is 
composed of 170 member States.  The most relevant organs are:  the Assembly, 
the Marine Security Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
(MEPC), and the Legal Committee.63 
Decisions at the IMO are taken by qualified majority, and the implementation 
requires States’ unanimity64 to be effective.  This decision process tends to make 
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 < http://www.airportwatch.org.uk/2015/12/the-exclusion-of-international-aviation-shipping-co2-
from-paris-cop21-deal-makes-2c-limit-close-to-impossible/ > 
61Airport Watch (2015) 17 NGOs write to European Commission to get them to push for inclusion 
of Aviation and Shipping in Paris Agreement, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://www.airportwatch.org.uk/2015/10/17-ngos-write-to-european-commission-to-get-them-to-
push-for-inclusion-of-aviation-and-shipping-in-paris-agreement/>  
62 Printing Bureau, Macao, Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Treaty, Art. 1, 
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64 IMO (2016) Frequently Asked Questions, retrieved.  16.04.16 
  <http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx>  
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negotiations quite lengthy65, and like it happened with the Annex VI of MARPOL, 
by the time a decision is taken, ratified, and has entered into force, it is time to 
update it again, thus making the process rather inefficient.66 
Important actors in the IMO decision making process are primarily States.  
Although other actors such as NGO’s, and prominent professionals –or 
associations- from the shipping sector may give their opinion, the final decision 
and eventual implementation67 rests in hands of member parties.   
2. The MARPOL Agreement 
The increase of industrial activity during the late 50’s and 60’s 68  caused an 
increase of maritime transportation69 , and of hazardous practices, such as the 
cleaning of tankers on high seas, discharging the polluted material into the sea, or 
discharges of oil/oily water from engine rooms70.  Such practices added to the 
shipwreck of the supertanker Torrey Canyon in 1967 at the south of England, 
raised environmental awareness leading stakeholders to negotiate an agreement at 
the IMO in 1973, the MARPOL Agreement71.  It has been ratified by over 55% of 
its signatories72 with binding effects between its parties. 
The MARPOL agreement –MARPOL stands for marine pollution- was initially 
thought to prevent oil related pollution and has gradually extended to other 
sources of pollution by means of its Annexes73.  It is important to point out that 
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being an international Treaty, each of its annexes has not been signed by the same 
parties –at least not at the same time-, and has not entered into force at the time of 
its initial signing. 
The MARPOL Treaty comprises different pollution sources occurring with 
occasion of maritime navigation74, and is applied to all vessels flying the flag of 
any State party of the agreement75.  The aforementioned annexes are:  i) Annex I 
(enforcement in 1983), oil discharges from ships;  ii)  Annex II (e. in 1987), 
noxious liquid substances;  iii)  Annex III (e. in 1992), substances in packaged 
form;  iv)   Annex IV (e. in 2003), sewage from ships;  v)  Annex V (e. in 1988), 
garbage from ships, and;  vi)  Annex VI (e. in 2005), prevention of air pollution 
from ships. 
Annexes I and II were negotiated with the main frame of MARPOL, and were 
mandatory for all the parties76.  The rest of the annexes were optional, and their 
entry into force took quite a long time to be ratified by the vast majority of States.  
This explains why annex IV entered into force before annex V:  pollution by 
garbage from ships had a more unified and accepted criteria rather than disposal 
of sewage from ships.   
3. Annex VI:  Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships 
Given the relevance to the purposes of this paper, Annex VI deserves a separated 
consideration.  Focusing on control and limit of air pollution from ships, it was 
adopted in 1997 and entered into force in May 2005 after ratification by the States 
representing at least 50% of the world’s shipping tonnage.77     
It was originated by the late 80’s, following a Declaration of Ministers of 
Environment of Coastal States of the North Sea, concerned about general 
pollution from shipping at the region.  Further to this Declaration, Norway made a 
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proposal in order to include the air pollution resulting from shipping activities in 
the MEPC’s agenda at the IMO.78   
Adopted in 1997, it entered into force in 2005, being Spain a party to the 
agreement, but not the EU.  Its objective was at first to control Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx), Sulfur Oxides-heavy fuels (SOx), ozone layer depleting substances 
(chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs), and combustion of polichlorated substances on 
board of the ships79.  In 2010-11 Annex VI suffered modifications, inter alia, 
tightening the cap of sulfurs from 3,50% to 0,5%, effective January 2020.80  By 
this sulfur cap reduction, we can see a mandatory, substantial measure. 
As for countering hazardous GHG emissions, in 2011 technical measures were 
taken, adopting a new chapter 4 to Annex VI:  i)  energy efficiency design 
(mandatory only for new ships);  and ii) ship energy efficiency management (for 
all ships)81.  Chapter 4 of Annex VI does not intend to achieve a specific objective 
by reducing GHG emissions, but inserts a series of technical measures whose end 
result is lowering the emissions to a minimum by means of energy management, 
implying an obligation of means rather than a specific result.  Chapter 4 of Annex 
VI entered into force in 2013 after ratification of the measure, being Spain also a 
party.   
According IMO expectations, provided the application of the measures, emission 
reduction ranges 25% to 75% of current discharges.82   
Since 2003, through Resolution A.963(23) of the Assembly, the IMO has engaged 
in the challenge of countering GHG emissions acknowledging them as an issue 
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for maritime shipping and thus, passing the task to the MEPC to identify specific 
regulatory mechanisms to lower GHG emissions83.    
Resolution A.963 (23) introduces different kinds of measures, like the 
aforementioned technical/operational efficiency management tools, and also 
market based mechanisms.  In order to know the operational convenience of any 
emission reduction policy, a process of monitoring and verification of CO2 
discharges from vessels is an essential first step.84   
Recapping what has been said, the main ideas as of IMO’s efforts are first and 
foremost, studies on GHG from ships and their impact, and the most important 
steps taken have been mandatory guidelines on energy efficiency in 2011, which 
entered into force in 2013, and will affect the entire fleet in at least 10 years.   
As mentioned before, one of IMO’s flaws is that all ships are treated according the 
no favor treatment principle, clashing with UNFCCC’s CBDR principle.  In my 
opinion, its policymaking is not likely to work, as negotiations are lengthy and 
implementation takes years to reach the entire fleet. 
Assigning control of aviation and shipping emissions to the sectoral organizations 
was flawed in origin.  It is impossible to achieve a global agreement given all the 
conflicting interests.  However not all is negative, mostly when two weeks ago a 
decision was taken at the seat of the IMO to design a monitoring, verifying and 
reporting emissions tool at a global level.  This initiative comes 9 months after the 
European Union has unilaterally enacted one of its own. 
C. Regional Level: The European Union 
In this section we will see on what basis the EU takes action on climate change in 
the area of transportation, how it interacts with the IMO in the regulatory making 
process and what is the Union’s framework on combating GHG emissions in 
general. 
                                               
83 Ibid 84 
84 IMO, (2003) Resolution A. 963(23)   
28 
 
1. Context 
Having an intermediate position between member states and IMO dealing with 
maritime pollution 85 , the EU has helped to harmonize and enact legislation 
towards the protection of the atmosphere in the region.   
As for shipping, the EU legislates in such areas since it holds competence on 
transportation86  (Art. 4 TFEU) and climate change87 (Art. 191 TFEU), acting 
through the Commission’s Directorate General for Transportation (separated from 
Energy in 2010), and for Climate Action, having representation at the IMO on 
behalf of the Commission.88  
In line with the second commitment period advanced in the previous Part, the EU 
focuses its regulatory efforts towards an ambitious reduction of emissions from all 
transportation sectors, including shipping89 inside the framework set by the 2008 
White Paper on Transportation, whose goal is to reduce emissions 20% les than 
the 2008 levels90.  It may be difficult in the shipping sector, as the mandate falls 
within the IMO scope. 
The EU is not member of the IMO; the Commission holds representation only as 
an observer91. However, there are two different ways for the EU to influence 
IMO’s regulatory task:  coordination with member states92, all 28 members of the 
IMO93, and unilateral action. 
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Erika and Prestige incidents in 1999 and 200294 meant a point of inflexion for the 
EU towards taking more stringent measures to prevent marine pollution 
developing the most advanced marine security policy in the world95.     This 
contrasted IMO’s lengthy policy implementation and the clash of interests from 
the shipping’s private sector causing the impatience of relevant actors such as the 
US96 and the EU, and consequently enacting regulation independently from the 
IMO, who catches up after the adoption of such regulations.97  Sulfur content of 
bunker fuels are an example of these conflicts.  
2. Air Quality Control  
a) Sulfur Dioxide Emissions 
Concern about protection of the atmosphere was present in the Commission as 
early as 1993 with the Directive 93/12/EC regarding the sulfur dioxide emissions 
from certain fuels.98  In the shipping sector, Directive 1999/32/EC was enacted to 
adapt to the Directive 1993/12 in order to control sulfurs on fuels for vessels99, 
and most importantly, to align with the –then- recently adopted and in course of 
ratification, Annex VI of MARPOL.  At that moment legislative efforts were 
centered on sulfurs from heavy fuels, and CO2 from the shipping industry was not 
yet part of the agenda. 
In 2002 the Commission passed a communication to set a Strategy to Reduce 
Atmospheric Emissions from Seagoing Ships, further to relevant legislation 
regarding the same issue in other sectors and to the Kyoto Protocol100.  This 
Strategy lead to Directive 2005/33/CE, amending Directive 1999/32 with more 
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stringent provisions on the content of sulfurs for marine fuels than the regulation 
discussed at the IMO, illustrating a clear example of the EUs unilateral approach 
and capacity to influence the IMO deterring it to follow her way on the long 
term.101   Directive 2005/33 was again to be amended in 2012, being today’s 
Directive 2012/33/EU. 
As for this issue, and following the opinion of Mr. Joaquim Cortés102, although 
the Union can’t legislate overlapping the IMO mandate, it happens in key issues 
such as sulfur content of bunker fuel, that the EU takes a step ahead of the IMO, 
to be followed short after.   Concurring with this opinion, Capt Javier Valencia103 
gives the example of the double hull demand from the US for oil tankers after the 
Exxon Valdez accident.  The US acted unilaterally, out of the IMO enacting its 
own legislation for ships calling for American ports.  
b) Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions 
First efforts to reduce CO2 emissions date back to 1991 with the Strategy of the 
Commission setting objectives to be attained in order to reduce emissions, such as 
keeping the levels of 1990 by 2000 through a series of measures ranging from 
energy efficiency to fiscal initiatives.104  
Further to the KP mandate, the Union developed landmark initiatives such as the 
Emissions Trading System (ETS): “cornerstone of the European Union’s policy to 
combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial greenhouse gas 
emissions cost-effectively” 105 .  The ETS represents the largest international 
system for trading emissions allowances in the world106 with successful results in 
its mission to reduce CO2 emissions from the industry. 
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The EU ETS is regulated by the Directive 2003/87/EC, and covers 45% of the 
EU’s GHG emissions on the 28 member States’ manufacturing plants.  Maritime 
shipping was excluded and in a first moment so was aviation, recalling Art. 2.2 of 
the KP, that refers the issue to the IMO and the ICAO. 
Nonetheless, and pursuant the EU’s then climate framework, -the Sixth 
Environmental Action Program of 2002107 and a communication of the European 
Parliament of the same year stressing the need to reduce atmospheric emissions 
from shipping108- maritime emissions were then part of the EU climate action 
agenda. 
This aim was later implemented through Directive 2009/29/CE, which in recital 3 
of the Preamble sets a due date to the IMO in order to reach an international 
agreement on CO2 emissions before December 31st, 2011.  Otherwise, the 
Commission would draft a proposal to include maritime shipping emissions in its 
reduction objectives109. 
A brief consideration should be taken regarding aviation emissions.  Directive 
2008/101/EC –today Regulation 421/2014- had foreseen its inclusion in the EU 
ETS, and it was incorporated for a short time lapse.  Directive 2008/101 intended 
to include all flights inside and outside –landing in EU airports- of the EU 
territory, but it raised doubts of its lawfulness since it also affected flights outside 
of the EU territory110.  The Directive was challenged in the UK by Air Transport 
Association of America, and a preliminary ruling of the ECJ emptied the matter:  
the Directive was in perfect accordance with international Law111.  However, 
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international pressure112 forced the Commission to stop enforcing the Directive in 
its original terms, and limited its effects to EU domestic flights and the EFTA113.   
It is relevant to mention the precedent of Directive 2008/101/EC since the legal 
issues it raised –core of this study- regarding jurisdiction and extraterritoriality of 
EU rules, will be reflected in any EU legislation concerning maritime 
transportation emissions control:  either a future inclusion in the ETS, or the latest 
Monitoring and Verification of Emissions Regulation, 2015/757/EU. 
D. Preliminary Conclusions of Part II 
Identified the actors at the international scene on  maritime CO2 emissions control 
and their interaction, we find on the negative side, due to conflicting interests and 
a slow policy implementing process IMO initiatives appears to be a step behind 
the EU’s, who bids for decisively regulating increasing levels of GHG emissions, 
in this case from shipping, but with the aviation Directive we have seen an 
example of its level of determination. 
As for the international legislation regulating GHG emissions from the shipping 
sector, it is almost nonexistent.  This phenomenon is rather new to the legislative 
debate and still in phase of research.  The few regulations such as the technical 
measures dictated by the IMO do not address the issue efficiently and according to 
the last IMO GHG study of 2014, at the current growing pace of maritime 
shipping, not even technical measures will suffice to mitigate the effects of 
increasing GHG emissions, expected to rise between 50% and 250% by the year 
2050. 
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III. Regulation 2015/757 (I):  Analysis and Outstanding Issues 
 
In this part we will analyze Regulation 2015/757 (the Regulation) and the 
immediate issues arising from its enforcement.  Scope of application, the object of 
monitoring, the process of reporting and verification and the enforcement will be 
assessed.  Special mention will be made regarding competence intra EU Law. 
A. EU Competence 
Prior to the analysis, it is necessary to establish the legal justification behind the 
regulatory action of the EU in the field of Maritime Transportation and Climate 
Change.   
1. Article 191 TFEU legal basis for climate change policy 
Point 4 of numeral 1 guides the EU environmental action towards the promotion 
of combating climate change114.  This explicit declaration covers EU policies both 
at the external and internal levels pursuant the protection of the environment, and 
combating climate change.  This provision enhances the EU action allowing the 
Union to influence as an international actor decision making processes in order to 
reduce GHG emissions.   
The ordinary legislative procedure is of application pursuant Art 192 TFEU115, in 
order to achieve the goals of Art 191.  
2. Article 4 TFEU  Competence on Transportation and 
Environment 
Conferral of competence in the areas of Transportation and Environment is of 
shared nature.  This means that legislation shall be taken by both the Union and 
the Member State. This last feature defines the intensity of the Union’s 
involvement in the matter:  a shared competence implies a medium involvement, 
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considering the full extent of exclusive competence and the marginal extent of a 
supporting one116. 
It also enables the Union to engage in the elaboration of preparatory documents 
containing guidelines and objectives that pave the way for future legislative acts, 
such as the Regulation.  Examples of such documents are the Common Transport 
Policy (2000), and in applied to shipping, the Green Paper on Maritime Policy 
(2006), among others117. 
3. Legislative Act chosen 
Regulation 2015/757 as its name depicts, is a regulation.  This is of legal 
importance, considering that the legislative instrument chosen to regulate 
environment is ordinarily a Directive118, as it is a shared competence. 
The main difference between both is that a regulation unifies criteria and a precise 
course of action around any given issue.  This means that in all 28 member States, 
regardless of their legal culture, the Union imposes its rules, and the means to 
achieve an objective. 
In contrast, a Directive harmonizes criteria, keeping in mind the differences in the 
legal culture of member States, establishing a common goal, which is to be 
achieved regardless of the means used by the States. 
This situation portrays the apparent unanimity and accordance of the member 
states about this regulation.   This accordance is confirmed by the fact that the 
proportionality and subsidiary assessment tool, Art. 5, Protocol 2 TFEU119, has 
not been called for, and this measure perfectly adapts to the concept of 
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conferral of a shared competence.  Novelty of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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proportionality:  its means are sufficient to achieve the desired results;  and no 
other action from the member States would be in the condition to reach said 
results. 
B. Objective 
The primary objective is to establish a CO2 monitoring tool, calculate the yearly 
emissions by focusing on data already collected by the ships120 regarding energy 
efficiency and fuel consumption, via certified verifiers of the sector.   
This will allow knowing with precision the degree of efficiency in the usage of 
fuels by vessels, and also enabling ship operators to manage their fuel 
consumption in a more efficient manner, as they will be the first ones to device a 
monitoring plan and to have the data.  The implementation of the MRV measure 
alone will help ship operators to a better usage of fuel and an immediate emission 
reduction of approximately 2%121.   
Also, as for decision making organizations, they will be able to have an informed 
debate on what to do with an already existing pilot experience conducted by the 
EU.  Long journeys start with a single step. 
C. Subjects and Obligations122 
1. The ship/company 
a) Before the Monitoring Year 
The legal obligation of the vessel will be firstly to design a monitoring plan of 
what the emissions are expected to be.  Secondly, have the plan verified to see that 
it is in line with the Regulation technical requirements.123. 
                                               
120 European Union, (2015), Regulation 2015/757, on the Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, Recital 
21 
121 DNV GL Verifiers, (2015) Preparing for the MRV Regulation, pp2  
122 European Commission, (2013) COM 2013/480, Proposal for a Regulation on MRV of carbon 
dioxide emissions from the maritime shipping, pp7, Flux Chart. 
123 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 4 
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b) During the Monitoring Year 
Conduct the reporting of the emissions for the Monitoring Year.  Once this 
reporting has taken place, in case the ship complies with the Regulation 
requirements, it must surrender the verified report of emissions to the Commission 
–the Agency established by it- and to the Flag State of the Ship124.   
In case requirements are not met, then the entity of the ship must revise them, but 
nothing is said of the consequences of not complying with the annual plan or with 
said regulation’s requirements125. 
An obligation of cooperation 126  with the verifier is also established, by 
surrendering any necessary information in order to ease up its verifying task.  (Art. 
15) 
2. Verifier127  
a)  Before the Monitoring Year 
On a second level, the obligation of the verifier will be that of assessing the 
monitoring plan established by the company. The assessment consists on checking 
that it meets the Regulation requirements.  Shall the monitoring plan not meet 
such requirements, it must be redrafted128.   
b) After the Monitoring Year 
Once the reporting has been conducted by the company, verifiers must 
corroborate it adjusts to the monitoring plan129.  If the report meets the own 
company’s plan criteria, the next step will be verifying if the report has been sent 
                                               
124 Vid. Op. supr , Regulation 2015/757, Art. 10-12 
125  Vid. Op. supr., COM 2013/480, Proposal for a Regulation on MRV of carbon dioxide 
emissions from the maritime shipping 
126  Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 15 
127  Vid. Op. supr., COM 2013/480, Proposal for a Regulation on MRV of carbon dioxide 
emissions from the maritime shipping, Flux Chart 
128 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 13.1 
129 Vid. Op. supr.,, Regulation 2015/757, Art. 13.2 
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to the Commission and the Flag State130.  In case of compliance, the verifier issues 
a document of compliance131, that will have to be surrendered when calling a EU 
port.    
As stated in Art. 14, the verifier must undertake its tasks observing the principles 
of bona fide and impartiality as for the data collected, and in no case –quite 
logically- are the entity behind the ship and the verifier to be related. 
3. Public Authorities 
a) Flag State and the Commission/Authority designated 
Receive the verified report from the vessel’s company when the reporting period 
has finished. Pursuant Art. 21, publish the information compiled of the last 
reporting period. 
b) Port State Authority 
The Port State Authority of the member states must check the compliance 
document previously issued by the verifier.  This is an obligation of the vessel’s 
company.  Non compliance gives place to sanctions by the Port State Authority132.  
It is also expected from the Port State –according to Art. 19- to ensure compliance 
of the Regulation, that is, to ensure that the ships calling for one of its ports carries 
the compliance document (Art 18).  Shall the ship be inspected –if necessary- for 
any reason not connected with the aim of this Regulation, the Port State must 
enforce compliance of Art. 18.   
D. Scope of Application:  Space, Time and Ships 
1. Geographic Scope 
As laid out in Art. 1, the geographical scope of application of the Regulation 
involves ships “arriving at, within, or departing from ports under jurisdiction of a 
                                               
130 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 11 
131 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 18 
132 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Article 18-20 
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member State”.  In other words, the entire distance is covered intra EU 
jurisdiction, but also the fraction of the journey outside of the member State’s 
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), that is, in international waters.   
Art. 2 further explains the geographic scope by leaving clear that the CO2 
reporting must take place from the last port of call, (incoming) to the port in the 
member State’s jurisdiction.  The expression “from the last port of call” includes 
ports out of the EU jurisdiction.  Departing from (outgoing) may also imply that 
part of the voyage takes place outside of EU jurisdiction. 
2. Timeframe 
As for the monitoring period, as advanced lines above, it takes place during a 
calendar year.  If voyages take place for a year period in two different calendar 
years, the previous one will count133. 
The first monitoring period of the Regulation will start on January 1st, 2018134, but 
obligations for the companies start much earlier: 
- By 31st of August 2017, the monitoring plans must be ready and submitted 
to the verifying entities (Art. 6). 
- 1st of January 2018, starting of the first monitoring period for the per 
voyage and annual monitoring (Art. 8). 
- 31st of December 2018, end of the first monitoring period. 
- 30th of April 2019, companies must have submitted by then the emissions 
report to the Commission (or the Authority designated, most likely the 
EMSA), and the Flag State. (Art. 11) 
- 30th of June 2019, from this date onwards, the obligation to carry and 
surrender when requested the compliance document will be on effect. (Art. 
18) 
                                               
133 Lloyd’s Register, (2015) European Union Regulation on MRV of carbon dioxide from Ships, A 
Lloyd’s Register Summary, pp2 
134 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 8 
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- Also on 30th of June 2019 and every 30th of June onwards, the 
Commission will make public the information specific to each ship 
regarding fuel consumption, CO2 emissions, and technical efficiency, 
among other parameters.  (Art. 21) 
There are outstanding issues to be covered by the Commission by the 31st of 
August 2017, which will be discussed advanced in this section. 
3. Ships 
The present Regulation will be applied to vessels, whose tonnage equals or 
exceeds 5000 GT135.  The ship’s flag or activity is irrespective to the application 
of the Regulation, it will be applied either to passenger or cargo ships as long as 
they fall into the gross tonnage category.   (Art. 1) 
Considering the tonnage limit, it would be interesting to state that if 5000 tons and 
plus will be covered by Regulation 2015/757, the State should take responsibility 
of  less than 5000 tons, but still contributing to GHG emissions. 
However, three exceptions count:  rudimentary ships not powered by carbon, 
governmental ships (military and government) and fishing ships are excluded 
from the Regulation’s scope. (Art. 1.1) 
CO2 emission verification will take place by assessing different parameters from 
the point of view of the ship’s functioning.  Date and port of departure as well as 
of arrival will be taken into account.  In relation to this, the time spent on the sea, 
including the time in motion and at berth136, the fuel consumed, the emissions 
consequently produced, and the nature of the cargo transported will also be 
covered.  (Art. 9) 
It is also a legal obligation (Art. 18) for the ship to carry always the compliance 
document, and to surrender it if requested by the enforcer. 
 
                                               
135 As set by the IMO International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 
136 Situation where the ship moors at the dock and safely floats on the water. 
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E. Enforcement and Non Compliance/Sanctions 
1. Preliminary Considerations 
Enforcement of the Regulation is assigned to the Port State Authority, as laid out 
in Recital 29 and Art. 20.  Instruments to such enforcement are Directive 
2009/16/EC, of Port State Control, which enables the inspection of ships, and the 
request of its documents; Directive 2009/21/EC, regarding compliance of Flag 
State requirements, when this Flag State is a member State of the Union;  and 
member Port State’s internal penalty regulations.  In view of the lack of 
provisions in Regulation 2015/757further to who is responsible for the 
enforcement and how the penalty regime will be enforced, it will be focused in 
light of Spanish port legislation. 
The Regulation establishes also the amendment to Directive 2009/16/EC, in order 
to allow request of the compliance document by Port State Authorities through the 
conduction of an inspection, as set out by Art. 13 of the Directive 2009/16.  The 
compliance document of Regulation 757 will be part of the documents listed on 
Annex IV.  (Recital 29 of the Regulation) 
2. Inspection Competence 
In Spanish Law, the legal act setting the governing rules to allow an inspection of 
the ship on the terms established by the Regulation, is the State Ports and 
Merchant Shipping Act137.  Specifically Art 263138, confirming the inspection of 
ships as one of the Spanish Ministry of Public Works139’ competences.  And Art. 
268140, establishing the competence of the Port’s Harbor Master141 a)  governing 
the grant or denial of port entry and expulsion, and; f) governing the conduction of 
inspecting tasks.  
                                               
137  Spain, (2011) Consolidated Version of the State Ports and Merchant Shipping Act (Texto 
Refundido de la Ley de Puertos del Estado y Marina Mercante) 
138 Ibid 146, SPMS Act, Article 263 
139 In Spain, the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) holds the competence for 
Maritime Administration of Ports of General Interest (such as Barcelona, or Tarragona) 
140 Ibid 146, SPMS Act, Article 268 
141 Official Authority in charge of the Port’s rules enforcement (Capitán del Puerto) 
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3. Non Compliance/Sanctions 
Recital 31 of the Preamble and Art. 20 define non compliance in two senses:  
failure to obey the MRV Regulation, and failure to comply with the monitoring 
requirements for two or more reporting periods.   
a) Failure to Comply 
For the first case, the Regulation leaves the matter to the Port State’s own 
legislation, establishing the obligation to “set up a system of penalties for failure 
to comply…” (Art. 20.1) From the wording of this provision, it is unclear as if it 
implies the creation of a new set of rules, or the use of the existing ones. 
For legislative economy sake, in the Spanish case the aforementioned State Ports 
and Merchant Shipping Act already institutes rules governing the penalty 
framework for non compliance with an inspection.  Art. 307 k) identifies such 
conduct as a serious infringement, penalized in Art. 312.2.b) with fines up to 
180.000 Euros.     
In order to assure the execution of the fine, the Public Administration holds the 
privilege of compulsory execution, ascertained both in Art. 318 of the State Ports 
and Merchant Shipping Act, and in the Public Administration Legal Framework 
and Common Administrative Proceeding Act, 30/92.  
b) Reoccurrence  
Failure to comply for two or more reporting periods has a different framework142.  
In this case the Regulation mandates that two or more consecutive failures to 
comply shall be punished with either the denial of entry into port or the expulsion 
from it by the Port State until the obligation of surrendering the compliance 
document is fulfilled. 
                                               
142 Vid. Op. supr., Regulation 2015/757, Art. 20.3 
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Interestingly, the aforementioned State Ports and Merchant Shipping Act punishes 
reoccurrence in Art. 312.4 with the sum of all consecutive fines, and numeral 5 
even foresees the detention of the vessel in Port.   
Prima facie, and if no new regulation were to be created by Spain, this situation 
would fall into the scope of the Spanish SPMS Act, whose provisions could be 
considered more strict than the Regulation’s:  in case of reoccurrence, the 
company will have to pay a fine, and run the risk of having the ship detained.  
However, as said before, the punishment established by the Regulation is 
explicitly the expulsion from the Port (Art. 20.3), and covertly the prohibition 
from entering EU ports to all infractors. 
F. Relevant legal Considerations 
Although the Regulation is already in effect, there are a number of issues still 
pending of specific regulation by the Commission.  The Regulation advances 
itself the resolution of these issues through delegated acts (Recital 35 of the 
Preamble and Art. 23).  The most important matters have been laid out in the 
following study.   
1. Templates143 
Templates are an essential instrument for the Regulation to work.  They are the 
means by which verifiers will communicate with the Commission to render the 
reports on CO2 emissions.  Very little has been said, even on the technical side, of 
what the contents of the templates will be.  As for the document of compliance, for 
instance, basic information such as the Flag State, last Port of call, IMO number144, 
among others have already been mentioned (Art. 17).   
Templates are necessary for the monitoring plan (Art. 6), for the emissions report 
(Art. 12), and no less, to the verifier in order to prove compliance of having 
followed the verifying procedures (Art. 17).   
                                               
143 European Commission (2015), Expert Group on Cargo Carriers and Templates 
144 IMO (2016), IMO Identification number schemes, retrieved:  16.04.16 
 <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/IMO-identification-number-scheme.aspx>  
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Recital 36 of the Preamble introduces that Templates will work in the context of 
an automated system, but once again the how will it work is delegated to the 
Commission through Comitology (Regulation 182/2011/EU) 
2. Verifiers 
Article 14 establishes general principles guiding the verifying tasks.  However, 
there is no reference as to how the verifiers will be accredited but the referral to 
regulation 765/2008145 .  Art. 4 of Regulation 765/2008 establishes that each 
member State shall appoint a national accreditation body, then the nomination will 
fall within the national scope of member States. 
Nothing has been said in case the verifier makes a mistake, or the ship’s company 
does not agree with the verifier’s assessment, which may be a quite common 
situation.  It is not known kinds of remedies are set for such a case.  The most 
logical answer would be administrative remedies, followed by judicial, but the 
Regulation leaves it to the implementation acts to be taken by the Commission. 
a) The EMAS Proposal 
On this matter and in view of existing EU environmental legislation we consider 
that Regulation 1221/2009/EC146 (the EMAS Regulation) would be applicable to 
the situation, as it may cover for the verifier process, as laid out on Chapter V of 
said regulation. Furthermore, pursuant Art 44 of EMAS, it would be integrated in 
the policies of the Union. 
Comparing both systems, EMAS Regulation proves to be a more specific method 
for environmental policies, rather than  765/2008, that pursues general situations.  
Moreover, even if Regulation 2015/757 were not to be applied, the EMAS 
Regulation could be of application as it works on a voluntary basis.   
 
                                               
145 Regulation 765/2008, setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance 
relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 
146 Regulation 1221/2009/EC, on the voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-
management and audit scheme (EMAS) 
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b) Regular Maritime Practice 
According to the Barcelona Harbor Master’s opinion, after the regular maritime 
practice, classifying societies –only 5 or 6- have a very good reputation in the 
sector regarding verification competences.  In large part this reputation is due to a 
good knowledge of the maritime business and needs.   
For this reason, he considers that classifying societies most likely will take the 
verifying responsibility within the scope of Regulation 2015/757.  
3. Final Considerations:  IMO global MRV  
Very recently, the IMO’s MEPC met in London to negotiate the establishment of 
a global MRV regulation, that intends to be mandatory, and articulated as an 
amendment to the MARPOL agreement147.  The sessions took place from the 18th 
to the 22nd of April, 2016 –day of the Earth148- and concluded with the decision of 
drafting such amendments and prepare a debate for their next MEPC meeting in 
order to instrument an agreement. 
It is worth mentioning that part of the intended system keeps privacy by default of 
the ships when reporting information to the IMO149, whereas Regulation 2015/757 
initially mandates that reports must be made public by the Commission, and 
foresees privacy as an exception150. 
Be as it may, Regulation 2015/757 establishes in Recital 36 that it will adapt to 
any MRV regulation taken at a global scale by the IMO, and declares that it will 
serve as a model of implementation.  Considering the time it takes for IMO 
                                               
147 IMO (2016), Organization agrees mandatory system for collect ship’s fuel consumption data, 
MEPC 69, retrieved:  27.04.16 <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/11-
data-collection-.aspx> 
148  United Nations (2016), International Mother Earth Day, April 22, retrieved:  27.04.16, 
<http://www.un.org/en/events/motherearthday/> 
149 Vid. Op. supr.,  IMO to set mandatory system to collect fuel consumption data 
150 Vid. Op. supr.   Regulation 2015/757, Article 21.3 
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resolutions to take real effect once ratified151, it is very likely that the EU MRV 
will start acting before any IMO measure. 
G. Preliminary Conclusions of Part Three 
The Commission has put an important effort on the adoption of this Regulation, 
reflecting the Union’s intention to address shipping GHGs.  However it must be 
stated that the Regulation is rather incomplete, giving the sensation that its 
ultimate objective, aside from emission considerations, was to pressure the IMO 
to act rapidly towards complying with the KP mandate.  Perhaps the pressure did 
have an effect, but the lengthy process of implementation of IMO measures will 
make the complete implementation of the EU MRV Regulation necessary, and 
thus, the outstanding issues must be solved timely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
151 Cfr. Part Two, the IMO.  IMO energy efficiency measures, for example, were taken in 2011, 
ratified and entered into force in 2013, and it is estimated that it will take 10 years to reach all the 
fleet due to a vessel’s lifespan. 
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IV. Regulation 2015/757 (II):  Extraterritorial Application 
 
In Part Three, we have covered the most relevant features resulting from the 
application of the Regulation, one of them being the geographical scope.  In this 
last section the lawfulness of the Regulation as for its extraterritorial application 
will be assessed.  This study will take place in light of general Public International 
Law instruments, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), the framework analyzed in Part Two, and the theory of jurisdiction 
and extraterritoriality, as well as case law relevant to the issue. 
A. Jurisdiction and Extraterritoriality 
1.  The Territoriality Principle 
Even if the obligation of surrendering the compliance document (Art. 18 of the 
Regulation) is enforced once calling an EU port, it must be considered that the 
monitoring and reporting of CO2 emissions must take place during the entire 
voyage, starting at the last port of call.  If this last port is an intra EU port, then the 
measure would be covered by general EU Law, given the general obligation of 
EU member States to obey and enforce it. 
However, the problem comes when the last port of call is located extra EU 
territory, that is, out of its jurisdiction implying an infringement to the principle of 
territoriality152 .  This principle establishes the capacity of a State in order to 
enforce its regulation inside its territory, with the sole limit of a third State’s 
sovereignty153.   
This allows us to construe that jurisdiction is linked to territory.  It is possible, in 
certain cases to exercise jurisdiction beyond the territory, the so called 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  It would happen by means of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
                                               
152 Ibid 44, Herz, Steffen Emissionshandelssystem in Luftverkehr, pp26, 27 
153 K ö n n i g  Doris, M o r g e n s t e r n  Lutz, (2009) CO2 Emissionen aus dem Schiffsverkehr, 
Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, pp8 
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defined as a connection between the State willing to assert jurisdiction, with the 
specific case –reporting CO2 gases- beyond the State’s borders154. 
2. Theory of Jurisdiction 
Further to the preceding point, although the State is bound to assert its jurisdiction 
inside of its borders, international case law grants that not only it is possible, but 
desirable that a State asserts jurisdiction beyond its limits.  In the ruling of the SS 
Lotus in 1927155, the International Court of Justice admitted that it would not be 
convenient to understand the limits of the State in order to exercise its jurisdiction 
outside of its borders as a general prohibition.  On the contrary, it admits that in 
some cases it might apply, and it would be restricted only by prohibitive rules156.  
This takes us to the known principle:  what is not forbidden is permitted. 
Considering such ruling, it would be possible to ascertain jurisdiction from the EU 
when enforcing the provisions of  Regulation 2015/757 regarding geographic 
scope.  On the negative side, it is also true that States not agreeing through a 
previous international instrument157 are not bound by EU rules directly.  However, 
there is a possibility to obtain compliance from a third State vessel: through the 
State’s right to deny or grant access to its ports.   
3. Port State Jurisdiction 
Port administration by official authorities may be one of the most clear exerts of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction by a State.  Port jurisdiction is defined by the capacity 
of the State to regulate and enforce rules in order to grant access to its ports158.  In 
                                               
154 Ibid 44, Herz, Steffen Emissionshandelssystem in Luftverkehr, pp26, 27 
155 SS Lotus, France v. Turkey 1927, as cited by H e e r i n g s  Moniek, (2012) Legality of a future 
EU Emission Trading Scheme for Shipping 
156 As cited by BRDeutschland, (2010) Integration of the Maritime Transport into the European 
Emissions Trading System, Umweltsbundesamt, pp82 
157 H e e r i n g s  Moniek, (2012) Legality of a future EU Emission Trading Scheme for Shipping, 
pp 35 
158 H e e r i n g s  Moniek, (2012) Legality of a future EU Emission Trading Scheme for Shipping, 
pp36 
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consequence, the powers held by the Port State are those of opening or closing its 
ports to incoming or outgoing ships159.   
The port state may discretionally, with the purpose of protecting the environment 
or the safety of maritime navigation, make use of its right of closing the port by 
expelling a vessel or denying entrance to a ship 160 .  Sole restraint to this 
apparently unlimited power lies on the possible infringement of multilateral 
agreements signed by the Port State161.  Given this dichotomy, we can conclude 
that access to port is a privilege –it is an exertion of sovereignty-, rather than a 
right, however nuanced by Treaties and international customary law. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), on its ruling of December 2011 
on the case 366/2010 of Air Transportation Association of America v. Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change (case 366/10) states as one of the key 
arguments of the case that any aircraft landing on a EU airport was bound by EU 
rules, adjusting the case to the territoriality principle.  This rule applied to the 
enforcement of the Regulation, implies that any ship calling for an EU port, must 
abide and surrender the document of compliance.  Moreover, in exercise of its 
freedom of calling a port, the vessel –the entity behind it-  automatically submits 
to the port’s legal framework162. 
4. Jurisdiction under UNCLOS 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed at 
Montego Bay in 1982.  Spain and the EU are member States of the Convention.  
                                               
159 Molenaar 2007a, as cited by BRDeutschland, (2010) Integration of the Maritime Transport into 
the European Emissions Trading System, Umweltsbundesamt, pp82 
160 Cfr. Part Three, enforcement/sanctions 
161 Johnson (2004) as cited by BRDeutschland, (2010) Integration of the Maritime Transport into 
the European Emissions Trading System, Umweltsbundesamt, pp82 
162 McDougal M.S & Burke, as cited by Heerings, Moniek, pp36 
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UNCLOS is also known as the constitution of the oceans163, establishing a legal 
framework for subjects and situations occurring at the seas. 
Further to this framework, we will present the most important features regarding 
the application of the Regulation in light of UNCLOS provisions: 
a) Maritime Limits of the States’ Jurisdiction 
As aforementioned, states hold competence and assert jurisdiction within their 
territory.  Coastal states have some extent of jurisdiction over the adjacent waters.  
Full jurisdiction over territorial waters, whereas only the right of economic 
exploitation on the Economic Exclusive Zone, and no jurisdiction at all at the high 
seas.  This implies that enforcement of the territorial scope of the Regulation may 
be conflictive, as the State holds no jurisdiction on the high seas. 
b) Flag State Principle 
Under this principle, the State of the flag flown by the vessel holds jurisdiction 
when it is on the high seas.  This explains the fact that the ship is always legally 
covered no matter where it is located:  at the state of the flag, under foreign 
jurisdiction, or at the high seas.  When at territorial waters, then the Coastal State 
may assert jurisdiction, with the sole limit of the EEZ.  This explains the conflict 
arising if the Regulation is enforced regarding the full extent of the voyage, when 
this has taken place outside of EU jurisdiction.   
c) Right to innocent passage 
As stated by Ringbom164, ships merely passing through the maritime zones of the 
EU will not be covered.  Innocent passage means the mere act of pass through the 
waters of a coastal State without calling a port.  Since the context of a passage is 
                                               
163 H e e r m e l i n g  Claudia, et al., (2015) Sailing into a dilemma:  An Economic and Legal 
Analysis of an EU Trading Scheme for Maritime Emissions, Transportation Research, Elsevier, 
pp42 
164  R i n g b o m  Henrik, (2011) Global Problem – Regional Solution? International law 
Reflections on EU CO2 Emission Trading Scheme for Ships, The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, Martinus Njuhoff Publishers, pp619 
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brief and does not intend to moor or use port services, it could be concluded that 
innocent passage will not be affected by the Regulation. 
Once assessed the enforcement of the Regulation according to recent judgments, 
jurisdiction theory, and the Law of the Sea, we will finally assess the justification 
for taking action. 
B. Justification of the EU measures 
1. Nature of Kyoto Protocol’s Art 2.2 Mandate 
Almost 20 years have passed after the Kyoto Protocol was signed.  Most experts 
agree that very little has been done ever since, and even less in the shipping and 
aviation sector.  Although the IMO hast conducted great efforts in order to 
regulate GHG from ships at a global level, in 19 years these efforts are limited to 
three –lengthy- GHG studies, resolutions from the Assembly recommending the 
regulation of such gases, and mandatory guidelines, of a technical nature and 
establishing no limit to maritime emissions165. 
Art. 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes a mandate for the signatories of the 
Protocol, to cooperate through the ICAO and the IMO.  From the wording of the 
provision, those organizations are not the sole and ultimate instrument to comply 
with the KP in the aviation and shipping sector.  It cannot be inferred the 
existence of a prohibition to act out of the IMO and ICAO, rather an obligation of 
cooperation in good faith.  Given the situation that the cooperation hasn’t worked 
as it should, is it fair that an economic block, in better shape to regulate and 
implement, takes regional action creating momentum to go further in the global 
level. 
Further to this, opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott166 on the case 366/10 
backs this thesis by saying that if it was the international community’s intention to 
establish an exclusive mandate to the ICAO –and by extension the IMO-, States 
                                               
165 Cfr. Part Two, the IMO 
166 European Court of Justice, (2010) Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, on case C366/2010, 
The Air Transportation Association of America and Others, para 177, 182 
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would have said so in the wording of the provision.  Finally, and following a 
similar line of reasoning, there is no conferral of competence from the States to 
the ICAO and IMO, but a mere understanding and cooperation in good faith.  The 
practical consequence would be that better prepared States would use their 
capacity to fulfill the Kyoto Protocol’s objectives.  
2. CBDR Principle 
This principle establishes same responsibilities for all nations of the world, but 
enhances those of developed countries in regard with developing countries167.  In 
the case of the EU, in the Impact Assessment document for the Regulation, the 
Commission refers to advances and reduction in CO2 emissions as of now, 
however need for shipping will grow in the upcoming years, placing the EU 
among the highest emitters of CO2 in terms of maritime transportation168.  This 
offers a clear example of the need for a differentiated approach given the different 
causes of the problem, but with the same global effect. 
Moreover, the EU has admitted indirectly the importance of this principle in the 
past.  Preparing for the Copenhagen COP in 2009, the Commission issued a 
communication calling for a global effort on combating CO2 emissions except for 
the least developed countries, being the smallest source of CO2 emissions169. 
3. Similar Protection of a Good of the Commons: Poulsen v. 
Diva Navigation 
Regulation 3094/86170, as early as 1986 already foresaw the protection of a good 
of the commons.  In the case of Poulsen v. Diva Navigation171 in 1992, the ECJ 
assessed Art. 6 of that Regulation, which compelled fishermen to return to the 
                                               
167 Cfr. Part Two, the UNFCCC 
168  European Commission, SWD(2013)237 Impact assessment, Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Regulation on MRV of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime shipping,  pp6 
169  European Commission, COM (2009) 39 Towards a Comprehensive Climate Agreement in 
Copenhagen pp5  
170 European Union, (1986) Council Regulation 3082/86 Providing for certain fishery resources 
technical measures.  Art. 6  
171 European Court of Justice, (1990) Poulsen v. Diva Navigation 
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ocean whatever fish stocks captured in certain protected areas.  The controversial 
issue172 in this case was that the ship was registered in Panama, rather than in the 
EU, and as a foreign flag vessel, it was not to be affected by an EU regulation, for 
actions that took place outside of the EU jurisdiction. 
It is important to mention that the EU is member of the Convention for the 
Conservation of the Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean173.  Indeed, being part of 
such an instrument gives more force to the Union’s legislative extraterritorial 
reach, however it must be acknowledged that in part, the spirit of the rule was the 
same of Regulation 2015/757, the protection of a good of the commons. 
C. Preliminary Conclusions of Part Four 
It is difficult to positively assess the powers of the EU when enforcing the 
Regulation beyond its boundaries.  As for the ECJ ruling in case 366/10, the fact 
that a ship calls an EU port would be enough to indisputably apply the EU 
framework to the ship.  In contrast, a generally accepted international instrument 
like the UNCLOS clearly establishes the areas where coastal states may exercise 
jurisdiction.  Among the two positions, the most doctrinally peaceful appears be 
that of the UNCLOS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
172 De B e e r e  Gert, R y n g a e r t  Cedric, (2011)  The ECJ Judgment in Air Transport 
Association of America And the International Legal Context of the EU’s Climate Change Policy, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, pp 406 
173 Vid. Op. supr., De Beere, Ryngaert pp408 
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V. Conclusion 
Identified the problem of shipping emissions, legislation has been enacted 
addressing the issue with more or less accuracy.  In light of the legislation studied, 
and the dynamics of the relations between policymakers, the following concerns 
have been identified, i)  impossibility of reaching an effective global agreement;  
ii)  clash of principles between the UNFCCC and the IMO;  iii) lack of conferral 
of competence from the States to the IMO;   iv)  implementation improvements of 
Regulation 2015/757, and;  v)  Extraterritorial overreach of the Regulation 
2015/757. 
1. The first problem that surfaces is the lack of capability to reach a global 
agreement.  Throughout the paper we have seen this problem repeating itself with 
global policies to address emissions, with IMO instruments, and it confirms itself 
with the latest Paris Agreement.  The lack of commitment, conflicting interests 
and consequent disparity of views will project itself over any instrument or piece 
of legislation and flaw any attempt to resolve the issue at an international level. 
2. In my opinion this has happened with the Kyoto Protocol regarding shipping 
emissions.  From a political climate point of view, the solution seemed reasonable: 
as for the transnational nature of the legal regime of a vessel, the best fitted entity 
to regulate shipping emissions should be the IMO. 
3. From a legal point of view however, such mandate suffers from a crippling flaw in 
origin:  the UNFCCC is guided by the CBDR principle, acknowledging an 
enhanced responsibility for large contributors of emissions.  In contrast, the IMO 
is guided by the no favorable treatment principle, giving a same treatment to all 
vessels, regardless of their Flag State.   
4. Moreover, regarding the Flag State, the IMO’s argument to support the no 
favorable treatment principle is that most of the fleet is registered in developing 
countries.  This is truth, and stands a rigorous legal reasoning.  However, in light 
of the economic data offered in this essay, it must be recalled that over 40% of the 
world fleet and 39% of the cargo is controlled by developed States. 
5. In view of the aforementioned, and regarding the regulatory task taken by the 
IMO, which in 20 years has produced three  -lengthy- GHG Studies and 
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guidelines towards energy efficiency of ships, not setting any limit to emissions in 
a decisive manner, complying with the Kyoto Protocol mandate, we must 
conclude that any regulatory attempt will risk to be contradictory, ineffective, and 
not timely, as the IMO –a technical organ- does what it can inside of a flawed 
mandate. 
6. Indeed, we must recall as well the nature of the IMO mandate, which in my view 
calls for a bona fide cooperation through the IMO, rather than an exclusive 
mandate.  Not implying any conferral of competence from the ratifying States of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the IMO, it is possible and desirable that policymakers 
committed to climate change such as the EU take a step ahead and lead by 
example, mostly when its task may serve as an example and incentive to the 
IMO’s regulatory efforts.  
7. As for the new Regulation 2015/757, the EU confirms its commitment to climate 
change policies in the region, although it raises legal concerns of two sorts:  i) 
implementation improvements, and;  ii)  extraterritorial overreach. 
8. Recalling the pending verifier’s appointment method in detail, and inspiring in 
already existing and enacted EU legislation, we suggest the use of Regulation 
1221/2009/EC on the voluntary participation in an eco-management audit scheme 
(EMAS Regulation).  Since Regulation 2015/757 is an environmental policy, the 
application of the EMAS Regulation would be an exercise of legislative economy, 
serve the aim of Regulation 2015/757 as per the verifier appointment, and would 
integrate EMAS into other policies and instruments of the Community, as laid out 
by Art. 44 of the EMAS Regulation.  
9. Regarding the initial questions of this essay, the Commission has proven to be 
reasonably efficient and the pending issues of the Regulation will be solved timely, 
and we wish to stress our suggestion on Recital 8 for that matter.   
10. However, as for the second question, the new Regulation is not likely to withstand 
a validity test outside of member state’s waters, and will be most probably bound 
to be challenged like Directive 2008/101.  Extensive interpretation of the nexus, if 
not covered by a general Treaty is not likely to have the same effects as in ECJ’s 
ruling Diva Navigation. 
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11. Further to this consequence, the atomization of jurisdiction will carry as an 
outcome an increased uncertainty and international friction between economic 
blocks, as every important actor will assert jurisdiction.  Then, even if necessary, 
the new Regulation will not serve for its original objective.  Rather, as Recital 34 
of the Regulation states, will serve as a model of implementation for the IMO, 
confirming one of the central ideas of this study:  when the EU takes the first step, 
the IMO follows. 
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Annexes II, III, and IV 
Annexes II, III, and IV contain interviews to relevant persons with broad 
experience in the subject treated. 
The interviews have been conducted in Catalan and Spanish, have been 
summarized, and transcripted in the same language.  
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VII. Annex II 
Resum de l’entrevista amb el Dr. Josep Enric Llebot, Catedràtic de Física a 
l’UAB, ex-Secretari General de Medi Ambient 
Sobre el Protocol de Kyoto 
En termes d’emissions, és veritat que alguna cosa s’ha aconseguit, però en termes 
de poder aconseguir un acord polític és on de veritat s’ha avançat bastant.  No és 
fàcil arribar a un acord polític internacional, al menys s’ha aconseguit això. 
És a dir, en termes d’emissions la reducció ha estat menys del que hauria de ser, 
ara bé, en termes de know how, de saber com verificar, com calcular, com fer 
inventari, i sobre tot, tenir un acord global en aquest sentit, sí que s’ha aconseguit 
molt.  Per això tot i que la reducció d’emissions sigui poc significativa, és millor 
tenir aquest Protocol que no tenir-ne. 
Sobre les mesures per a reduir emissions 
Mesures de mercat no tenen com a objectiu reduir les emissions, lo que volen es 
aconseguir es que la reducció que es fixin es facin amb el preu menys elevat. No 
es una eina que serveixi per a reduir emissions, sinó per a traslladar el menor cost 
social i econòmic a les empreses.  
Es el moment de negociar l aviació i el transport marítim? 
Després de 20 anys del Protocol, és necessari de gestionar, perquè desprès de 20 
anys hi ha una cosa que es objectivable que son les emissions que a l’atmosfera.  
Això s’ha de gestionar.  Lo que no pot ser es que les coses vagin descontrolades, a 
força de necessitat a la llarga se imposarà una taxa o impost mundial al carbó.  El 
problema s imposa si es fa unilateralment, si això no es comú, llavors sí que pot 
donar problemes de competitivitat. 
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VIII. Annex III 
Resumen de la entrevista al Capitán Marítimo de Barcelona, Cap. Javier 
Valencia 
Sobre las actividades de inspección en el Puerto de Barcelona 
Me refiere que se rigen por el Anexo VI del convenio MARPOL.  A todas las 
naves se les exige el Certificado IATP, en el que manifiestan todas las máquinas 
que tiene de combustión, lo que emite, y certifica que lo que cumple con respecto 
a los parámetros de emisiones.  Pero todo esto en lo referido a óxidos nitrosos, 
azufre… con el CO2 todavía no se han establecido obligaciones. 
Para que se limite el CO2 como los óxidos en el futuro se requiere un estudio 
preciso claro y objetivo de lo que se emite.  El documento IATP asegura que 
cumple con MARPOL respecto de las emisiones estándar.   
En el combustible hay una reglamentación nueva referente al SOx.  El buque en 
puerto no puede quemar un combustible de un contenido x de azufre, ni en la mar. 
Sobre las inspecciones (en comparación con el documento IATP) 
Si no lo tiene, le pueden detener o poner deficiencias.  Se comprueba el 
combustible de abordo.  Todo se hace en base al memorando de París, el París 
MoU.  Por esa norma se inspeccionan los buques que llegan a nuestros puertos.  
Se mira según prioridades, según el armador, tipo de buque se les va a 
inspeccionar. 
Se solicitan los documentos y certificados expedidos por su bandera.  Y si el 
inspector de la capitanía sospecha que no está correcto, procede a comprobar y 
demostrar cosas. 
Esas inspecciones lo que pueden llevar es a que corrija las deficiencias. 
Sobre la Reincidencia   
No se puede volver a los puertos de la región MoU, es decir todos los Estados 
europeos y Canadá.  Se procede al banning:  se avisa a los consignatarios que ese 
barco no puede volver a ninguno de los puertos. 
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Sobre lo que determina la inspección a un buque 
Hay buques que son imprescindibles inspeccionar.  Influyen muchas cosas.  
Cuando hay prioridad 1 que es máxima se tiene que inspeccionar. 
Interesan la edad del buque, armador, sociedad de clasificación, deficiencias 
anteriores, tiempo sin inspeccionar… es como un algoritmo que calcula el factor 
de riesgo, incluso la bandera:  gris, negra o blanca. 
Anualmente la lista cambia, y Panamá tiene una grandísima flota ha hecho un 
gran esfuerzo para mejorar la calidad y el control de los buques.  Liberia también 
ha mejorado, pero la clave está en las listas. 
Sobre la aplicación del Reglamento 2015/757 fuera de la ZEE en alta mar 
La clave del acuerdo está en la OMI, donde están todos, porque hay que incluir a 
todos, y para que se pongan de acuerdo tiene que haber un tonelaje de flota para 
que estén de acuerdo y suscribir el convenio.  Es una posición de poder porque 
concentran gran parte de la flota. 
Caso que recuerda:   
EEUU y la reglamentación de buques de doble casco.  El OMI iba atrás, la UE un 
poco también y EEUU acabó actuando unilateralmente.  Al ser países de gran 
tráfico marítimo se acabó imponiendo. 
Sobre los medios a su disposición para realizar las inspecciones 
las inspecciones vienen determinadas por supranacional.  La formación de los 
inspectores es de la EMSA, es muy uniforme 
Opinión sobre el reciente acuerdo de MRV global de la OMI 
Esto tardará tiempo.  Comparado con el water ballast management, puede tardar, 
no todos los países (tonelaje de la flota mundial) estarán dispuestos, mover a todos 
los países es bastante complicado. 
Sobre las verificadoras 
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Las sociedades de clasificación es probable que intenten ser acreditadas porque 
tienen mucho conocimiento del mundo marítimo.  A otras empresas les cuesta 
mucho más. 
Las sociedades de clasificación están de por medio, muchas banderas delegan en 
las sociedades de clasificación las tareas de control.  Hay una lista importante de 
sociedades, pero buenas, y reconocidas, son muy pocas, 5 o 6. Se puede uno fiar 
de lo que certifican, pero la mayoría pueden presentar deficiencias. 
Las sociedades de clasificación están muy íntimamente involucradas, por el 
conocimiento del mundo marítimo que tienen desde hace muchos años, sus 
reglamentos, etc.  Las reglas de seguridad van por delante, son las empresas que 
seguro acabarán entrando como verificadoras. 
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IX. Annex IV 
Entrevista amb el Sr. Joaquim Cortés, Gerent de Medi Ambient al Port de 
Barcelona 
Sobre les maneres de controlar les emissions de CO2 de les operacions 
portuàries 
El plantejament del sector marítim és el mateix que el dels altres sectors, ara 
estem en etapa d’inventari.  Cal conèixer les emissions dels vaixells bé, i una 
forma d’acreditar les emissions a nivell tècnic és a traves de tenir detalls sobre la 
crema de combustible, i de forma acreditada, amb els rebuts de carburant. 
Sobre la qualitat del carburant a les descàrregues de CO2  
La qualitat no té cap incidència, sempre s’oxidarà la mateixa quantitat de carboni 
correlativament al carburant cremat, es qüestió de quantitat, no de qualitat, la 
qualitat si incideix, potser molt poc. 
Ja si es tracta d’emissions no de CO2 llavors depèn de la zona, si és mar obert, es 
pot fer servir combustible menys refinat. 
Sobre les mesures per part del port de manera autònoma per fomentar la 
reducció de CO2 
Hi ha l’estratègia de CO2, amb dos propostes, l’Ecocalculadora, que amb base en 
el carburant fa un càlcul aproximat de les emissions des de el port de sortida fins 
al de destí.  I desprès està Zero Carbó, que calcula el carbono del contenidor des 
de que entra fins que se’l porten.  També es cert que els vaixells lliuren un 
certificat d’eficiència energètica quan arriben al port.  I l’ultima és la bonificació 
del 5% sobre les taxes portuàries als vaixells que contaminen menys, però s’està 
acabant de tramitar internament. 
Sobre l’iniciativa reguladora de l’UE amb el Reglament 2015/757 
Si la IMO no fa una cosa, la UE no pot fer res.  Lo que pot fer és anticipar-se una 
mica.  Par exemple, al tema del contingut de sofre al carburant sí que es va 
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anticipar i va disposar un contingut més baix que el que proposava l’OMI, pero al 
poc temps l’OMI va adoptar la mateixa graduació de l’UE, que es començarà a fer 
efectiu a partir de 2020.  Llavors sí que és cert que l’UE marca l’iniciativa i té una 
certa influència. 
 
Sobre les iniciatives d’us d’energies alternatives al port 
S’ha intentat fer alguna cosa amb energia eòlica, però no s’ha pogut, hi ha la 
servitud aèria de l’aeroport, i han dit que no.  Desprès, el Mediterrani transporta 
poca energia, i pel que fa a la fotovoltaica, tampoc perquè surt més car donat 
l’impost a la generació d’energia solar. 
 
 
 
 
 
